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Industrial Policy in Context; Comparative Experiences from
Chile and Zambia
Frank Chansa*, Ngao Mubanga, **
Dale Mudenda* and Manenga Ndulo*
* University of Zambia
** World Bank, Zambia Country Office

This article tries to draw lessons from Chile for Zambia on innovative industrial
policy and strategies that lead to industrial transformation and job creation.
The creation of quality jobs for the increasingly skilled youth requires significant
efforts. Industrial policy has been argued to have the potential to contribute to
the creation of employment through support for new and old initiatives in the
economy. In the case of Zambia, the economy has mainly been dominated by
the mining sector, where the creation of jobs has been very small, whereas the
comparator country Chile developed an institutional framework for industrial
policy that addressed market failures and encouraged innovation concentrated
in specific sectors. These were attainable given the country’s existing or potential
comparative advantage and therefore had strong growth prospects and impacted
on job creation. The study finds that Chile provides a rich experience that Zambia
can learn from in creating labour intensive job opportunities especially for youths.
Keywords:
Industrial policy, youth unemployment, industrial growth, state ownership,
agribusiness, employment creation

Introduction
Zambia saw robust growth and increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows
during the first fourteen years of this century. In contrast, employment creation
has been sluggish. Unemployment remained high, averaging 15% (World Bank,
2014). New jobs were only being created in the informal sector. In 2014, the
informal sector comprised 89.3% of total employment. Youth unemployment
remained high, estimated at 26% (World Bank, 2014). The large and growing
youthful population continues to pose serious socio-economic challenges.
Therefore, there is need to create sufficient jobs to absorb the increasing
number of youths who will be seeking jobs. The creation of high quality jobs for
the youth requires significant innovative efforts by policymakers.
The rationale for the use of innovative industrial policy for job creation
and structural transformation is robust. Industrial policies that support a
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range of activities increase the potential for structural transformation and the
creation of more jobs (Rodrik, 2010). This is exhibited by the decline of lowproductivity agriculture and low value added extractive activities, and a relative
increase in manufacturing and high-productivity services sectors. Despite failed
industrialisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, evidence from Chile shows that the
State is critical in influencing an industrialisation process that creates jobs.
The question that arises is how Chile supported specific sectors of
the economy, while at the same time avoiding the risk of creating “white
elephants”. The purpose of this paper is to draw experiences from Zambia and
Chile on innovative industrial policy and strategies that can lead to industrial
transformation and job creation. It looks at an industrial policy and strategy that
focuses on job creation and the role of the State. The rest of the paper is organised
as follows. Section 2 provides the methodological motivation. Employment
and industrial growth are presented in Section 3 and 4 respectively. Section 5
looks at the overview of Zambia’s industrial policy. Key sectors are identified in
Section 6, while the comparative experiences from Chile are drawn in Section 7.
The conclusion of the paper is in Section 8.

Methodological Motivation
Industrial policy is a set of measures and strategies that promote structural
change. Broadly, “industrial policies refer to restructuring policies in favour
of more dynamic activities generally, regardless of whether those are located
within industry or manufacturing per se” (Timmer et al, 2012). These policies
and strategies can transform an economy from primary production to value
added and diversified production. To increase productivity and create jobs,
industrial policies and strategies must not only concentrate on exploiting a
country’s comparative advantage, but must also support a range of activities
that will stimulate development and promote the creation of new jobs (Rodrik,
2010).
To create dynamic industrial growth, industrial policy and strategy
must meet three core principles (observed from successful countries) that
form our analytical framework (Rodrik, 2010). Firstly, a state of mind rather
than outlines of objectives: Industrial policy has to be an interactive process
between the State and private businesses to create “social capital” conducive
to investment. This embedment of the State in the private sector is essential
for sharing ideas necessary for the State to improve its selective and functional
policy interventions for the private sector to flourish (Ndulo, 2015). The highlevel interaction between the State and private actors helps in identifying the
requisite State interventions that largely depend on the level of development
and nature of the industry. For this to succeed active policies are required that
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provide incentives, direction, and coordination within policy makers and the
private sector; and between them.
Secondly, a successful industrial policy should be anchored on special
incentives that have well defined access rules and output indicators (Rodrik,
2010). The strategy must be to provide a combination of incentives and
compulsion. This suggests that incentive systems for new investors must
be temporary and optional. Failure to meet their objectives must attract
punishment. The intensity of such carrots and sticks could differ across industry
and over time depending on government policy. Several incentives ranging from
tax holidays, geographical location, subsidies, and trade-based incentives could
be given.
Thirdly, industrial policy should cultivate a favourable environment for
growth and development benefiting the entire society as opposed to a few
privileged bureaucrats (Rodrik, 2010). This requires an accountable and
transparent process of implementing the industrial policy and the associated
incentives.
Innovative industrial policy embedding these principles can accelerate
structural change towards more productive and dynamic activities in the
economy (Altenburg, 2011). This can lead to industrial growth, economic
diversification and job creation. The State has a key role in this. In Chile, the
State selectively promoted specific industries that had high growth potential. It
provided sector specific incentives and protection which gave the private sector
the incentive to start new industries. Some of these industries grew and some
failed. Lessons were learned.
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) argued for a
dynamic industrial policy to transform economies by creating competitiveness of
firms and protecting jobs in domestic economies (UNECA, 2014). The role of the
State herein is important. To generate industrial growth requires nudges from
the State (Kim, 1985). Industrial growth will result from policies and strategies
that allow a State to play developmental roles in the economy This will enable
the nurturing of policies and strategies that promote the State’s interaction with
the private sector, develop an incentive and sanction regime with defined access
rules and output indicators, and cultivate a favourable environment for growth
and development benefiting the entire society (Rodrik, 2010). This was the
experience in Chile, but has not been the case in Zambia.
For the purposes of our study we look at the experiences of Chile and
Zambia. Chile has not only enjoyed a successful industrial growth process but,
like Zambia, is resource rich. In 2013 it was ranked number 55 in the world in
terms of its MVA per capita (UNIDO, 2013). Chile’s industrial growth experience,
therefore, holds important lessons for Zambia. Insights on how it has managed
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to generate a dynamic industrial base with interlinkages to the copper mining
sector is of relevance to Zambia.

Employment in Zambia
Zambia’s economy suffers from a severe unemployment problem. This is
manifested by limited employment opportunities in the formal sector, and a
burgeoning informal sector. Total formal sector employment rose by 257.5%
in the fifty years since independence in 1964. This is against the backdrop of a
rise in the total population of 280.6 %, (CSO, 2013). Inevitably, there has been a
sharp rise in the labour force and the labour force participation rate over time.
However, employment has not risen enough to keep up with the rise in the
labour force, suggesting a rise in unemployment over time. Only 14% of the total
labour force was formally employed in 2014. Most new jobs have been in the
informal sector. These are mostly temporary and of a relatively poorer quality
than formal sector jobs. To understand the employment situation over time, we
analyse it in terms of four discernible episodes observed since independence
(Chansa et al, 2016).
The first episode was the 1964-1984 period. During this time, formal
employment increased by 37% from 264,100 in 1964 to 361,976 in 1984.
The period was characterised by robust growth. The State implemented an
import substitution industrialisation (ISI) and Zambianisation programme
(Seidman, 1974; Ndulo, 1979; Fincham, 1980). This saw a large number of
jobs created in sectors where state-owned companies were set up. However, as
the industrialisation programme faltered, the jobs began to disappear (Ndulo,
1979; Fincham, 1980). In the second episode, 1985 -1992, there was a spike
in employment levels, that rose from 361,976 in 1984 to a peak of 544,200
in 1991. This spike was driven by the ISI programme through initiatives such
as growth from own resources (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1990). This implied using
domestic resources to resolve the faltering economic situation.
During the third episode, 1993-2003, the State implemented an economic
reform programme, initially hesitantly but later hastily. Many state-owned
companies closed down with widespread job losses. Between 2000 and 2003,
formal employment declined further despite the rising GDP growth. One
possible explanation for this was that the mining sector was beginning to revive
and was gaining traction as the copper price was on an upward trend (Chansa et
al., 2016). This drove GDP growth. Employment data shows that over this period
employment in the mining sector increased by 39%, while that for construction
and services declined by 75% and 21% respectively. Thus, overall employment
declined despite the rise in GDP.
The fourth episode was the 2004–2012 period. This exhibited an overall
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rise in employment of 74%. This impressive rise in employment coincided with
the return to robust growth with real GDP growth at 6.9% over the period. The
mining sector drove the growth. The rebounding copper price reversed the
fortunes of the sector with spillover effects to other sectors in the economy. This
had a major impact on direct and indirect formal sector job creation.
Sectorial decomposition shows that employment has largely been driven
by the services sector(Chansa et al., 2016). For instance, between 1985 and
2014, employment grew in all sectors of the economy. This was dominated by
electricity, finance, and wholesale and retail trade. These also exhibited strong
growth (Chansa et al., 2016). In most other sectors, employment contracted
over the period. The construction sector experienced the largest contraction of
51.6% followed by the transport and manufacturing sectors. These contracted
at 36.2% and 24.8% respectively.
It is interesting to note that the manufacturing sector contributed 14.2%
to total employment during the 1985-1989 period. Services and agriculture
sector contributed larger shares at 29.8% and 15% respectively. In 2014, the
manufacturing sector accounted for only 8.1% and has since been overtaken by
the wholesale and retail sector. The latter is now the second largest contributor
to total employment after the services sector. The contribution of the
manufacturing sector in total employment has declined gradually over the entire
period in contrast to the services sector whose contribution has continuously
risen over this period. The change in fortunes for the manufacturing sector
is partly explained by the failure of the state sponsored ISI programme and
exacerbated by the post 1991 economic reforms as elaborated below.

Performance of the Industrial Sector
The performance of the manufacturing sector echoes the trends in employment
observed above. The Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) as a percentage of
GDP rose steadily from independence until 1992. It then fell sharply due to the
collapse of the ISI and consequent closure of manufacturing firms. This is shown
in Figure 11. Output shrank considerably both per capita and as a percentage
of GDP. It was much more pronounced as a percentage of GDP. This is because
while MVA contracted by 68.5% in the 1992-1994 period, GDP expanded by
12.6% over the same period. MVA per worker has generally been on an upward
trend since 2000. This is exhibited in Figure 2. This suggests that the average
productivity of manufacturing labour has been growing steadily.

5

Industrial Policy in Context; Comparative Experiences from Chile and Zambia

Figure 1: MVA per Capita and MVA (% GDP): Zambia: 1965 - 2013
Source: World Bank (2014)

What is more revealing is that, since 1995, the two trends seem to be
moving in divergent directions. While MVA per capita seems to have returned
to its upward trend, MVA as a percentage of GDP has continued to decline. One
possible explanation for this observation is that while MVA has been growing
modestly since 1995, this growth has been far outweighed by the growth in GDP
hence causing the ratio to keep declining. Thus, the performance of the industrial
sector has not kept pace with the performance of the overall econom.y

Figure 2: MVA per worker and MVA (%GDP): Zambia, 1965 - 2012
Source: World Bank (2014) and CSO Data
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The poor performance of the industrial sector is even more apparent when
we compare with that of Chile. This is shown in Figures 3 and 4. Zambia’s MVA is
stuck in the lower echelons while that of Chile seems to be growing. This trend
is consistent with the findings of Meller and Simpasa (2011)

Figure 3: MVA per Capita: Zambia and Chile, 1965 - 2012
Source: World Bank (2014).

In Chile, the MVA as a percentage of GDP has grown continuously. This is
shown in Figure 4. This is based on productivity gains and strong economic
performance. In Zambia, this seems to have grown intermittently during
the 1980s. This was due to increased manufacturing output under the ISI
programme and contraction of GDP. This explains why Zambia’s MVA exhibited
larger shares of GDP than in Chile in the 1986 to 1993 period. However, this
trend for Zambia reversed after 1995 following the collapse of most SOEs in the
manufacturing sector.
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Figure 4: Percentage Contribution of MVA to GDP: Zambia and Chile, 1965-2012.
Source: World Bank (2014)

Manufacturing in Zambia is dominated by the food, beverages, and tobacco
sectors. These contributed 67.6% of manufacturing GDP over the 1994-2012
period. The remaining sectors contributed less than 35% of manufacturing GDP.
The fact that this structure has persisted over a number of years illustrates the
fact that the efforts to diversify manufacturing output has been met with little
success. The share of the textiles sector in total manufacturing has declined
from 13% in the early 1990s to less than 1% in 2011.
Industrial Policy and Strategy in Zambia
Zambia has oscillated with policy reforms since independence in 1964.
Economic policies were initially liberal in the period after independence. They
turned inward-looking in 1968 and turned to a virtually free market orientation
in the early 1990s. In line with these changes, the country’s industrial policies
have also varied from liberal market strategies, to a state-led industrialisation
and back to free market strategies. We review the country’s industrial policies
since 1964 under three phases structured around the initial industrial policies
of 1964 to 1968, the second phase of inward-looking policies of 1968 to 1991,
and conclude with the discussion of the post-1991 phase.
The Initial Phase: 1964-1968
Zambia inherited a strong and one of the most prosperous economies in Africa
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(Baldwin, 1965). It had an average annual per-capita income of US$500 and an
average annual population growth rate of 3% (World Bank, 2014). Despite the
strong economy, the human capital situation was desperate. There were fewer
than one hundred university graduates and fewer than one thousand secondary
school graduates (O’Brien, 1982). Further, the provision of public infrastructure
was largely limited to urban areas mainly around mining towns. The economy
was dominated by an industrial enclave focused on foreign financed copper
mining, on which the high income was based2 (Baldwin, 1965).
The inherited industrial policy neglected the promotion of domestic
industry. The manufacturing sector was small and mostly foreign-owned.
Virtually all manufactured products were imported from abroad (Musonda and
Adam, 1999; Mudenda, 2009; Hawkins, 1989). To address this situation, the new
UNIP administration implemented the Transitional Development Plan (TDP) to
accelerate development, create employment, and diversify the economy away
from copper (Central Planning Office, 1965). The promotion of industrial growth
was a means of diversifying the economy. Industrial policy remained relatively
market-oriented. The State extended loans to the private sector through the
Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO). Between 1964 and 1968,
INDECO expanded its loan portfolio to private firms from about K2 million in
1964 to K16 million in 1967. However, Zambian entrepreneurs were scarce and
marginalised. Few had the skills, capital and experience necessary to establish
successful businesses (Craig, 1999; World Bank, 1984).
The First National Development Plan (FNDP) pursued objectives that
emphasised the diversification of the economy, import substitution, increased
employment, and reduction of inherited income inequalities between the rural
and urban sectors. Resources were pushed into education, social welfare, and
infrastructure. However, there was a worrisome perception of exploitation by
foreign entrepreneurs in the business sector. This led to a change in strategy of
how to organise the private sector. This was justified in the official “humanism
ideology”, a socialist-oriented policy that focused on group ownership,
redistributing income, and wealth rather than growth at the end of the 1960s
(Makgetla, 1986; Hawkins 1991).
The Second Phase: 1969-1991
In the late 1960s, the State was dissatisfied with the limited participation
of indigenous Zambians in economic activities. The foreign-owned firms
reinvested little and externalised all their dividends. The experience of the few
state-owned enterprises under INDECO was positive. This incentivised the
State to take controlling interests in existing private firms. Thus, through the
Mulungushi and Matero Reforms, the State pursued public ownership of several
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major companies (Turok, 1979; Craig 1999; Makgetla, 1986; Hawkins 1991).
The main thrust of industrial policy was to promote industrial growth through
State investment and State participation; this would further foster linkages
across sectors (Musonda and Adam, 1999; Craig, 1999). The strategy initially
targeted consumer goods such as food and beverages, wood and wood products,
textiles and wearing apparel. Subsequently, large-scale state investments were
automobile assembly, chemicals, and mineral products.
Under the Mulungushi Reforms, the State acquired 51% shares in most private
companies. Several manufacturing, hotel, and mining firms were later nationalised.
New state-owned firms were established. A number of manufacturing firms
were established in remote regions to promote rural industrialisation even if, at
times, they did not make economic sense. By the mid-1970s, State involvement
extended to areas as diverse as manufacturing, agriculture, mining, banking and
finance, retail trade, and tourism. By 1975, a relatively large share of industrial
output came from heavy industries such as chemicals, mineral products, metal
industries, and motor vehicle assembly. This was supported by revenues from high
copper prices during the period 1969 – 1975. The manufacturing GDP grew at an
average of 11% per annum. Its share in GDP increased from 6% in 1964 to 18%
in 1975. State-owned enterprises contributed over 54% of the manufacturing
GDP (Makgetla, 1986; World Bank 1984; Hawkins 1989). This was supported by
revenues from copper during the period 1969 – 1975.
Further, the State intensified its regulation of the private sector. Private
businesses, especially foreign–owned, were not allowed to grow beyond
prescribed sizes and were often restricted to specific geographical locations
and areas of operation. State-owned enterprises were mandated to produce
important and strategic goods. A Prices and Incomes Commission was
established to control prices. FDI in key sectors required government approval
and licensing. The licences stipulated conditions such as the size, location and
products that firms could produce (World Bank, 1984; Bhagavan, 1978).
Industrial growth was further spurred by the trade sanctions on Rhodesia,
a key source of imports, following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence
(UDI) in 1965. The sanctions created effective protection to domestic industry.
The import deficit stimulated domestic production to meet domestic demand
(Ndulo, 2015; World Bank 1984). The import substitution industries were also
supported through incentives such as guaranteed government procurement of
products from these firms.
To support industrial growth, the State designed a complex trade policy
regime. This comprised a mix of high and cascading tariffs (ranging from 0% for
capital goods to 150% for final consumer goods). An import licensing system
with quantitative restrictions was introduced as part of industrial policy. These
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policies led to the expansion of the industrial base, which was ranked third in
Sub-Saharan Africa at the time (Faroutan, 1993). The growth of the SOEs was
associated with rapid increases in formal employment. Between 1969 and
1975, formal employment in SOEs increased at an average of 12% per annum
(World Bank, 1984). In 1975, the SOEs contributed over 50% of manufacturing
employment. However, this employment trend stagnated as the economic crisis
set in after the mid-1970s. It picked up in the mid-1980s.
This industrial growth had inherent weaknesses that constrained its
sustained growth (Hawkins, 1991; Seshamani, 1994;). Firstly, inputs in many
industries, such as chemicals and automobile assembly were very import
intensive. They also used foreign technology with limited adaptability to local
conditions. This generated limited linkages to the rest of the domestic economy.
Secondly, the shortage of local skilled and educated workers was a major
problem. The shortage was worse at the operational and managerial levels. The
companies had to rely on expatriates to manage the SOEs. With the economic
crisis after 1975, SOEs could not attract and retain skilled personnel (World
Bank, 1984).
Thirdly, most SOEs remained inefficient. They relied on State budget support
and on cross-subsidisation of loss-making companies by profitable ones through
a complex organization of holding companies. This created complacency which
affected performance. The situation was exacerbated in the mid-1970s, when
the economy experienced adverse shocks from falling copper prices and rising
import prices (Makgetla, 1986; Musonda and Adam, 1999).
With a narrow tax base, the contribution of copper to state revenues fell
drastically from about 51% in the period immediately after independence to
an average of 10% between 1982 and 1991. The contribution to GDP fell from
36% to under 15% (Musonda and Adam, 1999). This made it difficult to sustain
the loss-making firms. Furthermore, foreign exchange shortages and the rise
in import prices reduced the economy’s capacity to import by almost 50% in
the mid-1980s. This affected the importation of spare parts and inputs in the
private sector and adversely affected capacity utilisation. The economic crisis
generated an insurmountable deficit in the balance of payments, exacerbated by
Zambia’s landlocked location which contributed to high transport costs (Craig,
1999; Seshamani,1994; Hawkins 1989).
To resolve the foreign exchange shortages, the State centralised the
allocation of foreign exchange. Priority was given to SOEs which made them
complacent in their pursuit of efficiency and profits (Seshamani, 1994).
The consequent overvaluation of the Kwacha fostered cheaper imports of
intermediate inputs and consumer goods. This effectively served as a tax that
reduced the competitiveness of exports in the international market.
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Despite the poor performance of SOEs after 1975, the State was only
concerned with maintaining employment levels in the sector. It vetoed any
closures that would result in large-scale redundancies. The inefficient SOEs
were supported by the State to maintain employment even in difficult times.
Consequently, worker productivity in SOEs fell by an average of 14% between
1975 and the mid-1980s (World Bank, 1984).
The poor performance was exacerbated by direct and indirect political
interventions. This was done through the State and the ruling party’s
participation on various boards that determined investment projects3. For
example, industries were established in remote regions without consideration
of trade costs and internal market access. This limited the competitiveness of
these products in international markets.
However, the private sector remained important in sectors where the State
did not crowd it out, but remained constrained by the dominance of the SOEs. It
had to bear similar costs as the SOEs such as low external competitiveness due
to the overvalued exchange rate. It had little support from the State. The private
sector was heavily taxed to support the public sector. It had far less access to
foreign exchange than SOEs. Often the private businesses survived and received
incentives on personal contacts with State agencies or assistance from business
groups such as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. There was no proper
structure for state-private sector dialogue (Hawkins, 1991). There were no clear
procedures for the private firms to access incentives.
In the early 1970s the State neglected the promotion of private small and
medium scale enterprises (SME). There was an effort to correct this deficiency in
the 1981 SME Act. Thereafter, there was a discernible effort to support small scale
firms in the private sector. This was aimed at expanding output and employment
to boost incomes, and foster rural development (Chansa et al., 2016).
What is discernible from the policies between 1968 and the late 1980s is
that the State worked to crowd out the private sector rather than complement it,
through the resolution of market failures and the coordination of markets. Three
major adverse shocks undermined the strategy. Firstly, the deterioration of the
terms of trade as a result of the fall in copper prices and rise in oil prices made it
difficult for the State to generate sufficient resources to sustain SOEs. Secondly,
the economy suffered as a result of conflicts among neighbours, which increased
the transportation costs of imports and exports. Finally, the State response
to the crises was to maintain consumption at the expense of investment. The
State delayed adjustment and used external borrowing to resolve the crises.
This resulted in the deterioration of the economic disequilibrium such as large
budget deficits, external debt, shortages of foreign exchange, and inflationary
pressures.
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To mitigate the disequilibria, the State resorted to increased controls
and regulations such as foreign exchange and price controls. It was hesitant
to adjust and reform the economy. Industrial policy and strategy remained
highly politicised and without any complementary policies such as technical
skills training for industrial and technological upgrading. The shortage of
skilled labour contributed to the weak performance of the industrial sector.
The business environment remained antagonistic to private investors with no
meaningful structure for state-private sector dialogue,

The Third Phase: 1991 and thereafter
After several policy reversals and hesitation to reform, the State, in 1989, started
to implement far reaching policy reforms. A new industrial policy to promote
the private sector was promulgated. Institutional arrangements were made
to oversee the process to privatise almost all SOEs. This period also coincided
with the reintroduction of multiparty elections in 1991 which saw a change
in the administration of the State from UNIP to the Movement for Multiparty
Democracy (MMD).
The MMD administration strongly pushed the reform agenda further under
the economy-wide structural adjustment programme. The reforms were swift
and far reaching. They replaced interest rates and price controls with marketdetermined policies aimed at restoring economic efficiency and growth in the
economy. Domestic and foreign trade was liberalised.
The practice of industrial policy witnessed a drastic change as outlined in the
Policy Framework Paper (White, 1997). Industrial growth was now to be pursued
through a market-driven and outward-oriented strategy. The policy eliminated
all industrial licensing (except for essential registration) for all levels of private
investment. The privatisation of SOEs was emphasised. The State committed itself
to privatising over 300 SOEs. Between 1992 and 1998, many SOEs in wholesale
and retail trade, tourism, manufacturing, and mining sectors were privatised.4
Meanwhile budget support to loss-making enterprises was withdrawn.
The 1994 industrial policy document concretised the new policy. This
was revised in 2010 and 2015, albeit with minor difference. The objective
was to support private industries that maximised the use of domestic inputs
and fostered linkages within the manufacturing sector and the rest of the
economy. The industrial sector was to contribute to the diversification of the
economy through exports of value added products. FDI was to be encouraged
to stimulate exports and induce innovation and technological transfer into the
economy. Several sectors were identified as growth sectors; food and beverages,
engineering products, wood products, leather, textiles and clothing (Mudenda,
2009, Chansa et al., 2016)
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To nurture industrial growth, the State pushed for a conducive environment
for the private sector to thrive. Thus, not only was trade liberalised, but the
current and capital accounts were also opened. The tariff structure was
rationalised and simplified. Several incentives such as tax holidays and low
tariffs on capital equipment and raw materials were provided to the private
sector in an ad hoc manner.
In 2005, another industrial strategy was initiated. This focused on
establishing multi-facility economic zones (MFEZ) under the supervision of the
Zambia Development Agency (ZDA). The purpose was to make the industrial
sector competitive through increased domestic and FDI in manufacturing for
exports. The investors in these selected areas are provided with complementary
physical infrastructure, customs and tax incentives as a way of fostering
industrial growth (Chansa et al., 2016). Unlike the experience from South
Korea, where the MFEZs are built on demand from the private sector, the zones
in Zambia are driven by a political agenda. There is very little involvement or
demand from the private sector. Furthermore, the zones lack a coordinated
and all-encompassing supply of complementary services such as skilled labour,
power supply, and established infrastructure (Chansa et al., 2016).
The State has also established a state-owned credit institution, the Citizens
Economic Empowerment Commission (CEEC) to foster the growth of locallyowned SMEs. The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) was also reestablished in 2014 as a holding company of all SOEs. Its objective is to secure
investment funds and promote industrial growth. The governance structure
of IDC does not drastically deviate from the initial INDECO board. The board
comprises influential political figures. Among them are three cabinet ministers,
the Secretary to the Treasury, and the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of
Commerce Trade and Industry (all appointed by the Republican president).
There are some members from the private sector. The president chairs all the
board meetings.
Areas for Industrial Growth and Job Creation
The Zambian State has formulated policies and strategies to foster industrial
growth. It has pursued many policies and programmes over the years. However,
these have not been dovetailed to job creation, institution building, and sector
specificity. Therefore, compared to Chile, there has been a poor record of
developing specific, viable, and implementable policy strategies to realise the
opportunities inherent in the key areas inhibiting growth. This has limited
industrial growth and job creation. What are these key areas whose nurturing
can enhance industrial growth and job creation? We focus on three of them. These
are youth unemployment, sectorial policies and institutions, and agribusiness.
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Youth unemployment
In Zambia, youth unemployment is a serious problem and currently at an
average of 18%. Therefore, it is imperative that a sustainable industrial policy
fosters jobs for the youth. Not only is there an urgent need for more youth
employment, but also a need for these jobs to be sustainable. While this paper
focuses on job creation holistically, it also looks at how Chile approached
the problem of youth unemployment and illuminates the valuable lessons
for Zambia; (i) the different mechanisms Chile used to create better and
sustainable jobs, and (ii) how they ensured that the youth acquired the skills
necessary for various industries.
Sectorial Policies and Institutions
Today, Zambia faces challenges in fostering private sector growth and prosperity
through public policies despite having identified key sectors for growth.
Additionally, the State has not been successful in realising the opportunities
inherent in the identified areas. This is largely due to lack of comprehensive
and viable policy strategies, or lack of institutional capacity and political will.
A clear understanding is needed on how Chile supported specific sectors of the
economy, while at the same time avoiding the risk of creating “white elephants”,
how State support can be linked to the expansion of industrial output in priority
sectors and sustainable job creation and, lastly, what mechanisms have been
used for supporting the different sectors, which reduces the risk of rent seeking,
weakened governance, government failures, and corruption.
Agribusiness
One relevant sector that has been considered important for potential growth
and job creation for Zambia is the agribusiness sector. Agribusiness could create
employment and generate incomes along the value chain from the primary
producer to the consumer. It can widen the tax base, and increase foreign
exchange earnings (GRZ, 2006). Therefore, understanding the barriers to the
expansion of agribusiness and what Chile has done to overcome these barriers
is important for Zambia. The key questions asked are: (i) What has Chile done to
ensure private sector growth and job creation in the sector? (ii) How to identify
potential agribusiness sectors and what are the main barriers to expanding
agribusiness? (iii) Which specific policies have allowed Chile to overcome these
barriers?
Industrial Policy and Strategy in Chile
We look at industrial growth in Chile to draw some lessons from its experiences.
We examine the role the State played in promoting industrial growth and
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employment creation. We seek lessons on the key areas of youth unemployment,
sectorial policies and institutions and sector specific policy formulation for
growth and job creation, focusing on the agribusiness sector.
The involvement of the private sector in the creation of quality jobs is
recognised in the development literature. Industrial growth is crucial in this. As
stated earlier, industrial policy is not only a list of specific policies, but it is also
a state of mind that mandates collaboration between the State and the private
sector (Rodrik, 2010). We therefore look, at how the State, through industrial
policy, engaged the private sector to spur industrial growth and create jobs. The
experience of a mineral resource-based country, such as Chile, in ensuring a
successful industrialisation process is relevant to the growth process in Zambia.
Chile grew from a low-income to a high-income country since the 1960s.
During that time, it sustained positive growth rates. In the 1970s, Chile pursued
protectionist policies with high tariffs to spur its industrial growth. This
strategy led to shortages of foreign exchange, high inflation and declining GDP.
It, however, spurred some industries but stunted export growth, especially in
products like copper and salmon. In the mid-1970s, the country changed its
stance and carried out major reforms. The economy was liberalised, SOEs were
privatised and sustained efforts were made to control inflation. The reforms
were implemented in three phases; 1974-83, 1985, and 1990. These were later
continued and strengthened after 1990. The State focused on international
trade to revive the economy. It promoted exports of copper, silver, wine, salmon,
seafood, and lumber. These policies were continued by the post-Pinochet
administrations.
To spur industrial growth, the State encouraged experimentation, learning
by doing, R&D, accumulation of tacit knowledge, and innovation. It developed
an institutional framework for industrial policy that addressed market failures
and innovation. Innovation was treated as an explicit policy goal. The focus
on state-supported innovation was concentrated in specific sectors where the
country had existing, or potential, comparative advantage and therefore had
strong growth prospects.
The innovation practices pursued commercial application of ideas that
were at the frontier of knowledge and introduced set ideas that were being
used elsewhere (self-discovery). This was funded through the Corporacion
de Fomento de la Produccion de Chile (CORFO) and the Consejo Nacional de
Investigacionen Ciencia y Technology (CONYCIT). The former subsidised the
demand for innovation and the latter subsidised the supply of knowledge by
universities and research centers. Innovation was funded from the State budget
and the mineral royalty tax. Tax rebates were offered to R&D activities and to
FDI in high technology sectors.
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CORFO was established to increase innovation, entrepreneurship, and
competitiveness in the economy (USAID, 2009). It controls INNOVACHILE, which
is in charge of the application of the country’s innovation policies to increase
competitiveness. INNOVACHILE provides grants to companies and technological
centres. This funding depends on risk, innovation potential, economic potential
and externalities and the degree of collaborative effort.
R&D activities benefited from tax credit and tax-deductible allowances. This
implied that much of R&D expenditures was paid for by the State. Furthermore,
all types of R&D expenditures were allowed. This could be performed in-house,
by third parties, or partially done in a foreign country.
The State targeted sectors that had already demonstrated comparative
advantage and showed strong growth prospects. It built on those successes by
introducing advanced technology into production. It focused on upstream or
downstream activities of the selected sectors. The sectors targeted were copper
mining, aquaculture, fruit production, beef, pork, and poultry, and off shoring
services.
The specific sector strategy in mining, was to move towards engineering
services (upstream), or chemicals for mining, or mining machinery
(downstream), rather than focusing only on the export of ore. In other words,
because of the strong specialisation in natural resources, Chile had acquired
particular skills and technologies in mining (e.g. mining-related engineering
services). This took advantage of the proliferation of global value chains. Miningrelated engineering services were exported. This loosened the link between
copper prices and the country’s export performance. The strong position in
the upstream segments of the copper value chains made it possible to add
other activities, such as further chemical or manufacturing processing, to its
raw copper products. In fisheries, the State adopted Norwegian technology in
salmon production in 1981. This was after several failed attempts throughout
the 1960s and 1970s to grow trout and salmon. Salmon exports increased from
about US$1 million to about US$159 million in 1991 and US$2.4 billion in 2008.
Chile is now the second largest salmon exporter in the world. This was also the
experience with the blueberry sector, which was established in the 1980s and is
now a major export product.
Over the years, the country faced challenges with institutional capacity. The
State responded by putting up mechanisms that would allow the economy to
overcome these. For example, when the State was setting up new industries,
CORFO facilitated the training of managers and key personnel abroad. In the
case of salmon production, CORFO provided the funds for people to go to
Norway to acquire skills.
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Employment Creation and the State
Chile has faced youth unemployment. Young people aged between 15 to 29
years represent about 40% of the working population. Youth unemployment
was on average 2.5 times higher than that of adults in the 1980s. Informality in
employment was much higher among the youth than adults (UNESCO, 2012).
The advent of liberal reforms led to a spike in unemployment. The youth were
more adversely affected by the reforms because they had low levels of human
capital formation. However, youth unemployment declined over time from
30.5% in 1980, 22.7% in 1985 and 13.1% in 1990. It stood at 16.1% in 2012
(World Bank, 2012). This shows that youth unemployment has significantly
reduced. We can learn valuable lessons on how this was accomplished.
The high youth unemployment emanated from the uneven distribution
of opportunities provided by the education system. Youth with the lowest
levels of formal education, mostly from poor families had the highest risk of
unemployment. The economic reforms created a stock of young people from
poor families, with inadequate levels of human capital. These were marginalized
and exposed to high-risk behaviours such as crime, drugs and violence (Aedo,
2004).
To address the problems associated with youth unemployment, the State
started schemes oriented towards the youth. Notable among these schemes
were the Chile Joven and the Extra21(Chansa et al., 2016). The schemes
designed special training programmes outside the framework of the traditional
mechanism to equip youths with the right skills (Vezza, 2013). Furthermore, a
number of methods to support youth employment or to address labour demand
barriers were used. Incentives were given to employers to address the scarce
demand for young workers. These were based on legislation such as the uneven
minimum wage, the wage subsidy and reduced social security contributions
(Chansa et al., 2016).
Sectorial Policies and Institutions
Chile’s industrial policy focused on resolving specific market failures that
affected the economy, improving productivity and raising the technological
content of existing sectors. A number of market failures were identified. These
were credit constraints affecting SMEs, dearth of university students from lowincome households, labour training, the public goods nature of some types of
export promotion activities, and innovation.
The State supported specific sectors through the activities of an
entrepreneurial institution called Fundacion Chile (FCh). FCh acted as a venture
capitalist. It promoted innovation and self-discovery. It set companies in new
sectors of the economy. These were later sold off to the private sector (e.g. the
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salmon project). It also promoted partnerships with private investors with a
clear exit strategy. The Agency concentrated in six natural resource abundant
sectors. These were agribusiness, marine resources, forestry, environment
and chemical metrology, human capital, and information and communication
technologies. In the marine, forestry, and agribusiness sectors, it promoted
commercial projects that utilised technologies that were not in use in Chile
(Alvarez et al., 2003). Examples are the salmon and blueberry industries.
The State provided financial and technical support for MSEs through Fondo
de Garantía para Pequeños Empresarios (FOGAPE). Access to credit was a major
constraint facing MSEs because of the lack of collateral and a track record of
timely repayment. FOGAPE guaranteed a certain percentage of the credit granted
by financial institutions to MSEs, small exporters, and organisations of small
businesses. The guarantees were used to secure credit for working capital and
investment projects. Small business associations could use the guarantees for
infrastructure investment, purchase of equipment, and irrigation and drainage
projects.
The costs to the State of the FOGAPE programme were estimated to
be negligible. The State provided a subsidised loan preparation scheme for
micro enterprises. This increased access to bank credit by many formal micro
enterprises (Agosin et al., 2009). The State subsidised new exporters and
supported the selected sectors in a manner that reduced risks of rent seeking,
poor governance and corruption. Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la
Competitividad (CNIC) was set up to create platforms useful for several sectors
(e.g., the development of a venture capital segment of the capital markets) and
to undertake strategic bets on specific industries. To minimise rent seeking and
benefit capture by bureaucratic interests, the Council was made permanent and
its members nominated by the president and ratified by the Senate. The term
of office of the councilors would not coincide with that of the president. This
would help avoid problems of political patronage and interference. The Council
consisted of academicians, business leaders, and high government officials. This
was to ensure checks-and-balances to policy making.
Agribusiness
Chile identified potential growth sectors in the economy. It looked for sectors
that were within reach, given the country’s existing or potential comparative
advantage, and had strong growth prospects. Agribusiness was one such sector.
The country faced a number of challenges in developing the agribusiness
sector. These required a mix of interventions to resolve them. There were
coordination problems which made it difficult for the sector to take off. It was
difficult to attract private investment. Firms lacked access to credit. In the early
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1970s most of the firms were SMEs. These were considered high risk and denied
credit by the banks. There was also a lack of human capital in the sector. There
were not enough workers with the required skills and in some cases, none. This
meant that productivity was very low. There was poor infrastructure and low
mechanisation.
The State designed policies to resolve the coordination problem. These
included actions that addressed legal constraints. It introduced subsidies to
attract private investment to the sector. A loan guarantee scheme under FOGAPE
was introduced to resolve the problem of access to credit. The guarantee scheme
reduced risks that banks faced when lending to agribusiness SMEs. There were
deliberate efforts to provide human capital for the sector. This involved targeted
training and acquisition of skills required for the various agribusiness firms.
This was necessary to raise productivity.
The State used a combination of channels to get this done. It sent managers
and employees abroad, for example to Norway, to learn the practical skills in
salmon production. Workers learned how to adapt Norwegian technology
to Chilean conditions in the early days of the salmon industry. Furthermore,
the State and the private sector invested significant resources to train skilled
professionals in the industry. The State facilitated training programmes in
biochemistry, pathology, engineering, business administration, and aquaculture,
among others. This was done at local universities. In addition, the Salmon
Institute of Technology (INTESAL) provided training for workers. There were
fiscal incentives that enabled firms to claim tax deductions on expenses incurred
in the training of workers (UNCTAD, 2006).
The State also strengthened agricultural production to support the
development of the agribusiness sector. It provided subsidies to farmers. For
instance, farmers received subsidies to install or improve existing irrigation
systems on their farms. Communities and regions benefited from off-farm irrigation
investments made by the State. There was also a soil recovery programme. This
provided subsidies to finance activities to recover or improve degraded soil.
Some of these activities included: phosphate fertiliser applications to restore the
natural level of soil fertility; calcium fertiliser applications; the establishment and
regeneration of grasslands; soil conservation, and crop rotation.
Subsidies were provided to improve access to credit and an agriculture
insurance programme was introduced. A subsidy was given to farmers who took
out crop insurance. Risks covered were those caused by climate hazards such as
drought, excess or untimely rains, hail storms, snow, and wind. The eligible crops
included cereals, industrial crops, vegetables, and legumes. There were also
subsidies aimed at improving the productive, managerial and entrepreneurship
capabilities of small scale farmers (OECD, 2008).
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Specific Lessons for Zambia
Chile provides a rich experience that Zambia can learn from. What are these
lessons? We look at these lessons in respect of the key areas for Zambia, whose
resolution is labour intensive and would create increased job opportunities.
These are youth unemployment, sectorial policies and strategies, and support
to the agribusiness sector.

Youth Unemployment
There are important lessons on how to manage the problem of youth
unemployment. Chile used different mechanisms at different times to resolve
youth unemployment. How did they ensure that youths acquired the right skills
for industry and that there was no skills mismatch? The key lessons are those
from strategies that overcame labour demand barriers for youth and the need
for comprehensive skills training.
The first lesson is that to resolve the youth unemployment problem there
is need for strategies that overcome labour demand barriers for the youth.
This requires a combination of interventions that stimulate labour demand.
The youth are endowed with lower levels of tacit knowledge or know-how
compared to adults. This implies that the youth tend to have lower productivity
than adults. It is this perceived lower productivity that discourages firms from
hiring them. Therefore, in order to encourage firms to hire the youth, they have
to be given incentives to compensate for the lower productivity.
Chile used a combination of interventions to stimulate demand for youth
employment. They introduced a variable minimum wage policy. This stipulated
a lower minimum wage for anyone aged below 19 years. They also put in place
wage subsidies for any firm employing the youth. The State intervened through
the payroll scheme to lower pension contributions for the youth. All of these
interventions were aimed at reducing the perceived cost of hiring a youth and
thus stimulate demand for youth labour.
The second lesson is that it is important to conduct skills surveys to see what
is needed and then adopt a comprehensive skills training approach. Identifying
the skills gap is a starting point to resolving youth unemployment. The training
initiatives must involve the private sector. In Chile, the State carried out surveys
to identify the type of skills that employers needed and matched them to the
needs of the youth. They initiated free training schemes for both technical and
soft skills for diverse types of youth beneficiaries. Training was offered mostly
at the semi-skilled level. Internships were encouraged and they put in place job
counselors for the youth. In order to encourage the firms to carry out training
upgrades for their workers, the State made the expense incurred by a firm on
training to upgrade the skills of workers tax deductible. In short, Chile adopted
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a comprehensive approach to ensuring that the youth are equipped with the
right skills.

Sector Policies and Strategies
There are important lessons that have emerged from Chile concerning the
pursuit of sector policies. This is in respect to actual policies, initiatives and
strategies. We discuss these in respect to six major lessons learned. These are
the need to identify key sectors to support, the coordination and monitoring of
selected sectors, the opening up of new sectors, the framework for supporting
SMEs, investment in R & D, and the lack of institutional capacity.
First, there is need to identify key sectors to support. The principle of
comparative and competitive advantage should be the guiding principle. This
requires a systematic strategy to identify sectors to support. The argument is
that in the context of a finite resource envelope, concentrating resources in a
few sectors with growth potential will have a large impact on the economy and
employment creation.
In Chile, the State set up companies in new sectors of the economy. It would
later sell them off to the private sector. The salmon and blueberry industries are
examples. The State also technically and financially supported SMEs. It designed
loan guarantee schemes and subsidised loan applications.
The experience from Chile suggests that by focusing on the economy’s
comparative and competitive advantage, the State will inadvertently foster labourintensive industrial growth that creates jobs. Chile focused on increasing production
and exports of mining, agricultural, fishing and forest products. These were labourintensive. It targeted sectors which had already demonstrated a comparative
advantage and had strong growth prospects in the international economy. The drive
was to build on those successes by introducing advanced technology into production
and by moving upstream or downstream of the value chain. For example, for copper
mining, moving upstream meant going into fine cable production while moving
downstream meant going into production of chemicals used in mining operations.
Once sectors were selected, there are lessons to be learned from the
coordination and monitoring of the sectors. One has to effect a strategy that
allows for coordination and continued monitoring of supported sectors. This is
likely to ensure efficiency in the implementation of the support to the sectors,
make it possible for early detection of potential problems with the support
process, and allow for adjustments to be made.
In Chile, the coordination was a responsibility of a council. The council was
a permanent body whose membership was assigned to academics, business
leaders, and high government officials. This was in order to ensure checks-andbalances to policy making.
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The third lesson is a strategy of opening new sectors. The State has an
important role to play in opening up sectors which may initially have been
perceived to have an unfavorable risk to return profile by the private sector.
Experience from Chile has demonstrated that economies usually have certain
sectors where the chances of setting up a successful company may be very
low for a variety of reasons such as lack of expert know-how in that sector,
uncertainty about markets, lack of infrastructure, etc. In such cases setting
up a company for the first, second, or third time may not result in a profitable
venture. In other words, the rate of failure may be unusually high. In such cases,
it requires someone prepared to persevere in the face of many unsuccessful
attempts. Faced with such high rates of failure, the private firms are usually
unwilling to lead the way in such a situation. The State can give a nudge.
In Chile, the State set up new firms in certain sectors by itself or in
partnership with the private sector with an exit strategy. For example, if the
State set up a firm in a sector by itself, then it must ensure that once this new
firm is viable, the State sells it to the private sector. By so doing, the State has
led the way in opening up this sector (i.e. demonstration effect) and at the same
time has avoided the risk of creating a “white elephant”. This is what happened
in the case of salmon cultivation. The State sold the firm to a Japanese firm after
it had demonstrated that the activity was viable. Similarly, if the State decides to
set up a new firm in a sector in partnership with the private sector, it must enter
into an agreement with private partners to eventually buy out the equity stake
of the State in the venture. This was the case in blueberry fruit production.
The fourth lesson is the need for a framework to support SMEs. The lack of
access to credit has been identified as a major constraint facing SMEs. This is
explained by the fact that SMEs are generally viewed as high risk clients and as
such banks and other financial institutions will only deal with them if they are
able to charge higher interests. This inevitably reduces the ability of the SMEs
to access credit.
Experiences from Chile suggests that the State created mechanisms for
supporting SMEs both technically and financially. The State created a loan
guarantee scheme to help reduce the perceived risk of lending to the SMEs. This
enabled them to borrow at lower interest rates from the commercial banks. It
also provided technical assistance to the SMEs through extension services and
subsidised the loan application process.
The fifth lesson is that investment in R&D is critical to spur industrial
growth. R&D investment is costly. There is, therefore, need for the State to have
a clear R&D funding strategy. The State must foster experimentation, learning by
doing, research and development, accumulation of tacit knowledge, innovation,
technology adoption and adaptation. There are two approaches in organising
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R&D efforts. A focus on new inventions and technologies and adopting already
established technologies. The State rigorously pushed for R&D. It focused on
undertaking and adopting already established technologies. This might be the
most relevant and practicable for Zambia.
Chile offered incentives for R&D. The State treated innovation as an explicit
policy goal in their development agenda. This focused on specific sectors given
the country’s existing or potential comparative advantage. It had two channels
of funding innovation. The State subsidised the demand for innovation and
subsidised the supply of knowledge by universities and research centres.
Resources for innovation came from the State budget and the mineral royalty
tax. In order for innovation to succeed, there must be policies geared to stimulate
both the supply and demand for innovation. Equally important is the fact that
the State must have a clear funding strategy for R&D and innovation.
Lastly, the sixth lesson is what to do in situations where there is a lack of
institutional capacity. In this case the State should find mechanisms of learning
from other countries. Chile sent people abroad to learn. This was done in the
cultivation of salmon. Chile sent people to Norway to learn how to adapt the
technology used in the sector.

Development of the Agribusiness Sector.
Lastly, we draw lessons on how the State in Chile identified potential agribusiness
sectors. What are the main barriers to expanding the agribusiness sector? Which
specific policies can overcome these barriers? Here, there are two important
lessons for Zambia. This is in the identification of potential agribusiness sectors
and in the monitoring of incentives.
Firstly, the identification of potential agribusiness sectors should be
done within the framework of comparative and competitive advantage. The
identification of potential agribusiness sectors in Chile was done in much the
same way as general sector identification was done. This was by considering
the comparative and competitive advantage of the various agribusiness
sectors. There was coordination between the State and the private sector in
the identification process. The State looked at activities that were within reach,
given the country’s existing or potential comparative advantage, and that had
strong growth prospects. Secondly, a number of barriers to the development of
agribusiness have been identified. Some of these are access to credit and finance,
lack of infrastructure such as transport and storage, lack of human capital,
insecure policy environment, low mechanisation, and poor coordination.
The way that the country tried to overcome these constraints is noteworthy.
This involved a number of interventions. For instance, subsidies were provided
to improve access to credit, subsidies for improving irrigation systems and
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soil recovery programmers. The aim was to encourage more private sector
investment. There was also a deliberate effort to invest in human capital required
for the respective agribusiness sectors. The State, through local universities,
carried out training programmes for workers. Other institutions such as the
Salmon Institute of Technology also carried out training of workers. Subsidies
were provided that aimed at improving the productive, managerial, and
entrepreneurship capabilities of small scale farmers. The State also embarked
on proper planning and coordination to ensure that the incentives are having
the desired impact. Equally important, there was political commitment at the
highest level to move the sector forward.
Zambia and Chile evolved different industrial policies and strategies over
time. Chile managed to transform its industrial structure, while Zambia failed to
do so. Chile garnered the developmental nature of the State to play a critical role
in the industrialisation of the country. These policies and strategies hinged on
the State’s interaction with the private sector, the nature of the incentives and
sanctions regime, and on how to share broadly the benefits from the growth
process.
Endnotes
1

2
3
4

The manufacturing sector is composed of the following sub-sectors: food, beverages
and tobacco; textile and leather industries; wood and wood products; paper and paper
products; chemicals, rubber and plastic products; non-metallic mineral products; basic
metal products and fabricated metal products.
The mines were mainly financed by capital from the U.S.A and the United Kingdom.
Although efforts to depoliticise boards and management of SOEs were made in the 1980s,
political interventions through State appointments to key positions remained rampant.
The process of privatisation involves the dismantling of the corporate structures through
which enterprises were held in the state sector and the development of these within the
private sector. The business community that preferred privatisation was well represented
in the MMD government, this made it easier to accept such radical changes.
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